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ABSTRACT 
 
This article embarks on making a political analysis of Islamist politics by criticizing the 
hegemonic approach in the field and considering a number of the institutions or structures, 
composing of either state and its ideological-repressive apparatuses, political parties and actors, 
intellectual leadership and ideology, and political relations, events, or facts in political sphere. 
The aforesaid approach declares that the social and economic factors, namely class position, 
capital accumulation, market, education, and culture, have been far better significative for a 
political study in examining any political movement, party, and fact or event. However, our study 
will more stress on political structures, events and struggles or conflicts produced and reproduced 
by the political institutions, the relationships and the processes in question. Taking into account 
all these, it will be argued that they have been more significant as compared to class position, 
capital accumulation, market in economic structure, or culture and education, in a political study. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The question, ‘how politics in Islamic world is studied’, is rather all-important in terms of 
clarifying and comprehending Islamist politics in Muslim societies. It asks what kind of the 
structures or the institutions, the relations and the processes we should look at when examining 
politics. Notwithstanding, there seems to have been a dominant approach that attempts to analyze 
Islamist politics in Muslim world and paves the way for being overlooked at other approaches. 
By a dominant approach, what we imply is that it has been interested in paying more attention to 
some structures and relations like education, economy, class position, capital accumulation, 
market, globalization, and technological and communicative improvements than anything else in 
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analyzing Islamist politics. It would essentially found a direct relationship between politics and  
society, where the far-reaching changes and transformations have carried out in line with global 
economic progresses, by reducing politics to socio-economic-based changing in Muslim 
societies. Having considered a good number of variables such as education, economy, capital 
accumulation, social classes, market, computer-based technologies and communication tools, and 
globalization within Islamic societies, this approach would embark to study Islamist politics, 
namely Islamist political parties, and movements in the light of these changes, by referring more 
to sociology of Islam, including the social and economic transformations mentioned above, as a 
theoretical-analytical approach. It will be one of the essential points of our criticism in the 
context of how to analyze Islamic politics.  
 
Our criticism will basically contain a debate as to why these social and economic changes or 
transformations have dominated such a political analysis. The main line of our discussions will be 
about questioning a reductionist relationship which this dominant approach has established 
between the changes/transformations at issue and politics in the Muslim societies whose 
structures and/or institutions would be asserted to have been exposed to comprehensive social 
and economic changes. With a more society-centered perspective, it has been an approach 
challenging political structures and institutions. So, given the above-mentioned approach’s 
arguments and remarks, in our debate the main point will be more related to why a political 
analysis should be made which appraises the political movements, parties, facts and events 
shaped by certain political structures or institutions in political sphere involving state, political 
parties, ideology, intellectual leadership, political culture, political actors and leaders, and 
political relationships and processes. Our analysis that endeavors to deal with a variety of the 
political changes and transformations in the Islamic societies will draw attention to more political 
structures and processes than social and economic transformations, computer-based technologies 
and communication tools, and globalization as a whole. Therefore, unlike the approach stated 
above, we will argue that it should be regarded the political structures and institutions in a 
political analysis.   
 
Besides, interestingly the approach in question sets up a correlation between Islamist politics and 
some modern ideologies, among which have been conservatism, liberalism, and so forth, for 
explaining and comprehending the present Islamic politics. It thinks that an Islamist politics can 
be synthesized with modern ideologies by paying regard to a number of changes or 
transformations in economy and class position, including new middle classes with religious-
Islamic disposition and particular a capital accumulation. At this point, for instance, it has 
asserted that a political position, such as Islamic liberalism, can be formulated by blending 
Islamic elements with liberal ones, alongside the formation of a capitalist class within Muslim 
groups. What is more, there have been manifold discussions with regard to whether such a 
political position, supported by new social classes who have capitals and economic powers, 
would be a politics more moderate and pro-reform rather than a revolutionary and radical one. As 
a result of this, this approach would speak of the different ways of Islamist politics precisely 
separated from one other, which have been represented by the multiple and heterogeneous 
Islamic communities or groups. They have entered into capitalist economic relations, got a 
modern education, tended to be more rational, and at the same adopted the dominant patters of a 
capitalist consumption and market-oriented lifestyle in keeping with new social classes. They 
have had intellectuals and technical intelligentsias (engineers and technicians) getting education 
in modern educational institutions with the religiously-conservative disposition. Accordingly, 
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there were thus no longer a monolithic Islamic politics. It would be a politics more complicated 
and differentiated, supported by the Islamic groups who have different economic interests and 
contra-political orientations, fragmented and divided into classes in globalized world. In this 
context, there would be mentioned from having been numerous Islamic politics dissimilar to one 
another from radical, revolutionary, and authoritarian Islamist politics to reformist, moderate, and 
even liberal Islamic one.  
 
This article discusses three major points: first, the basic claims that dominant approach has 
alleged and used to analyzeIslamist politics, based on the socio-economic transformations and 
changes in technology and communicative tools in Muslim societies, located in globalized world; 
second, how a political analysis there has been made by this approach, considering its arguments 
and views stated above; finally third, what type of a political analysis there should be made in 
order to be able to clarify and understand Islamist politics better. We shall argue that another 
political analysis is highly possible which pays regard to the political structures, consisting of 
state and its apparatuses, ideology, intellectual leadership, political movements and parties, facts 
and events, and conflicts and struggles between groups. We will try to give a more concrete 
framework to this analysis through the cases of Indonesia, but mainly of Turkey, on the basis of 
our assertion that all everything that is political, composing of its structures and/or institutions 
mentioned above, are more constitutive and significative, without making a political 
reductionism, than a socio-economic change and transformation in structuring a political party, 
movement or ideology in Islamic world.  
 
2 The Main Arguments for an Analysis of Islamic Politics: Economy, Education 
and Culture in Muslim World 
 
To begin with, we will directly associate our analysis to some basic questions with ‘what kind of 
analysis should be made in order to explain Islamic political groups and movements?, how the 
major changes and transformations in Islamic politics should be comprehended’, which will 
debate the fundamental theoretical and conceptual framework of the dominant approach in the 
analysis of Islamic politics. This framework to elucidate Islamic politics have had a main 
argument. The relevant argument would be that the engine force of change in Islamic politics has 
been more society-centered changes like economy, education or culture. For instance, for it 
economy gives rise to transforming the political structures or institutions, the ideologies, the 
intellectual leadership, the political organizations and actors, by the virtue of occurring some 
economic changes like developing a capital accumulation, changing class positions along with 
emerging new middle classes with religious or conservative dispositions, or forming a global 
economy visible with the emergence of a market-centered neoliberal economic structuring 
throughout the world.  For instance, education shifts one’s cultural appreciations and perceives, 
paves the way for forming a new opinions and viewpoints relating to religion, and brings new 
outlooks and thoughts in some fields, namely politics, economy, or culture. The changing culture 
under the influence of economic structures and education redesigns one’s political ideas and 
ideology, views about state, political party, or democracy. Taking all of these into consideration, 
one thinks it is only possible to make a political analysis with regard to Islamist politics by 
grounding on those society-centered changes in Muslim societies.  On the other side, this also 
expresses a dominant form of analysis that has specified what structures should be looked at and 
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how Islamic politics should be analyze in order to explain and understand Islamism and the 
Islamist political currents in Islamic world. 
 
Economy, one of the most discussed points, is one of topics on which is most dwelled to clarify 
the transformations tied to the political structures and institutions in Islamist politics.  What is 
implied by the economy has been primarily new class positions, expressing the emergence of the 
religious-conservative middle classes, and the increasing of capital accumulation produced by the 
foregoing classes in various economic sectors, namely textile, food, or construction. These 
variables have been interpreted as an outcome of neoliberal capitalist globalization. In a 
globalized era, the world had socially and economically gone into new history commemorated as 
a revolutionary turning point between 1978-1980 years. It was meaning the emergence of an 
industry-based capitalism and rapid urbanization, the rising of level of education with increasing 
number of those who gets training in secular educational institution, and the formation of market-
oriented democratic institution and mechanisms in developing countries.1  The widening place of 
globalization and the growing global capitalism had reshaped the positions of Muslim individuals 
in contemporary Muslim societies.	One was, too, class position. It has been underlined that many 
entrepreneurs and Muslim businessmen emerged in a great deal of economic sectors. 
 
Conjunction with the change in class position stated above, a new middle class, who have more 
conservative and devout tendencies and works in media, educational institutions, and professional 
management in companies and bankings, has been pointed out to have arisen in Muslim societies. 
As Nasr has indicated, all these developments created a new elite stratum, and middle classes, 
sharing similar views about globalization and neoliberal capitalism and economy policies. In his 
opinion, it can be told that they have been religious followers of capitalism who have caused a 
true modernizing change in Islamic world.2 Focusing on a range of issues like capitalism, class, 
or state in Turkey, Gülalp does state that globalization started to weaken the power of nation 
states since they would no longer freely continued full-employment, provide economic 
development and conserve reformist welfare policies. Political Islam in Turkey, points out 
Gülalp, engendered a convenient ground in rise of petty entrepreneurship and decline of 
traditional working class politics between 1960s and 1970s.  Having improved under the 
globalization conditions in Turkey, political Islam was a classic populist movement, mobilizing 
urban poor with combination of upper and middle classes into action against the status quo.3 It is 
quite considerable to try to explain the impact of these special actors because there has been an 
Anatolian bourgeoisie which had given monetary support to promote emergence of divergent 
Islamic movements and discourses through communicational-technological apparatus, including 
written-visual media like television, radio, and newspaper. Asking question of “Who are these 
actors”, Yavuz signifies that an Islamic capitalist class has arisen as the result of the neoliberal-
economic policies in Turkey, establishing a ground for the leading economic conditions and the 
major finacial networks as an outcome of deregulation and open economy. 4  The expansion of 
enterprising mobilised by Islam socila groups has expedited the ratio of capital accumulation and 
export-based growth, which enables the formation of Anatolian enterpreneurs. This new 
situation, including an increasing wealth and capital accumulation, had shifted Anatolian cities’ 
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viewpoint in addition to the growth of new middle classes.5 In consequence of neoliberal policies, 
these classes, which had gradually grown stronger, had anymore a more effective role 
economically and politically among Islamist groups.  To be sure, new conservative-religious 
middle classes was not comprising of merely capitalist class, having capital accumulation and 
apparent economic power, there were at the same time Muslim intellectuals and intelligentia 
(engineers and technicians), who have got training in modern educational institution.  
 
One of the main indicators of economic and social development was the educational institutions 
that had emerged new educated actors in Islamist groups and movements, who consists of 
executive elites politically, and culturally writer, journalist, and –organic- intellectuals. Those 
political and cultural elites were mostly a product of modern education, getting eduation in mass 
in the modern-secular institutions. This modern institution has also paved way for the formation 
of new social groups differentiated from one another with the emergence of new elites in Islamist 
communities. For this reason, the education has usually been referred to explain the reasons why 
the Muslim societies started to change. Stating that universal higher education has smashed the 
traditional religious institution’s monopoly on religious scholarship, Kurzman states that this at 
the same time caused pluralism and differentiation in intellectual and political discussions with 
respect to religion and Islam.6 The basic reason for differentiation has been Islamist new 
intellectuals, though they were challenging all secular presuppositions about society, state and 
culture, who are educated in modern institutions. Roy, one of those closely well-known with the 
book, “The Failure of Political Islam”, mentions from a same thing. He expresses that the actors 
of political Islam arose substantially from modern educational system. However, they were, states 
Roy, rejecting the ulamas, who they supposed to be in the charge of making a political alliance in 
modern society, without accepting having a theological knowledge.7  
 
In the case of Turkey, Göle speak of the presence of a similar social group. She alleges that 
counter-elites arose with conservative and pious tendencies, including intellectuals and 
intelligentia mentioned above. For, in her thought tin Turkey secularism became exceedingly 
functional in creating a counter-elites, besides republican elites, taking initiative for the 
establishment of a Republican Turkey and adopting and defending its founded principles and 
values. This fundamentally became through the national education system, which was performed 
under the authority of the Ministry of Education. These new agencies were symbolizing the 
transition of Islam from the periphery of Turkish society to its center, namely the state and its 
institutional appratuses, and yet were be a product of the educational institutions provided by the 
center, consisting of secular-national elites.8 More importantly, the large part of new engineering 
administrators were coming from the modest lower-middle class families in small Anatolian 
provinces and towns. They have performed a leading role in building up Turkey’s new export-
oriented industrilization model. They express that their logical-scientific outlook, mathematical 
reasoning, and access to technical language have made them possible to find better solutions to 
Turkey’s problems. The Muslim engineers, propounds Atasoy, have not had a preconceived, 
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stereotypical image of West. On the contrary, their ideas seems to have reflected a give-and-take 
relationship within a tactic of economic competition.9 
 
Besides that the modern institutions/structures, economy and education, have both differentiated 
economically Muslim masses and provided to gain different views about religion, Islam, society, 
state, or politics through education, new cultural orientations in Muslim groups were also slowly 
changing the patterns of consumption, and lifestyles. Because the one way to create and 
differentiate an identity in Muslim societies is to anymore find religious symbolic expressions in 
the domain of consumption. Especially, following 1980s, a period when a rapid liberalization 
process, and neoliberal economic policies emerged, these expressions have showed themselves in 
new social classes’ lifestyle. Those classes have been conservative in values but avant-garde in 
consumption practices. As in a secular media tool advertising a non-religious lifestyle, and a 
variety of cultural patterns and consumption, the religious televisions and radio channels, 
financed by Islamic capital, have played an important role in communicating religious lifestyle. A 
rich and prolific Islamic media tools, ranging from Islamic pop music to romance novels, 
women’s magazines, best sellers, and movies, have advertized a popular Islamic culture10. 
Bearing all of these in mind, Introvigne makes a classification by politically separating the 
consumer group in question into five categories, in the form of ultra-conservative, conservative, 
moderate conservative, liberal, and ultra-liberal. Liberal category is the consumers ready to 
accept dominant liberal values and principles. Ultra-liberals have consisted of ‘modernists11’ 
which embrace liberal values and wish to be granted them a religious approval. Conversely, 
conservatives think that the dominant liberal values have been unfavourable and dangerous. 
Ultra-conservatives do say that these values have not been required, by arguing that they have 
been immoral and even satanic ones. Lastly, moderate-conservative consumers wholly reject 
modern values but do abstain from explainging them on the basis of religious traditions, and 
attempt at reinterpreting religion for appearing a religious opinion in compatible with modern 
world12. At the moment, considering all these mentioned here, it seems that alongside economic 
and social transformations, a cultural structure –in a more way of consumption and lifestyle- has 
paved the way for emerging new political forms and apperances, by transforming itself in contact 
with those structures in a global world.  This is because they shape one’s identity, taste structure, 
and lifestyle, and even affect how money would be spent.  Immediately after the transformations 
in question within economic structure, new area that religiosity itself expresses would be 
anymore market. Market both provides religion a large area of motion in order to exceed the 
loyalty to ineffectual political parties and state apparatuses by creating an area, like market, for 
increasing religiosity outside political power and institutions, and opens it to a culture of market-
oriented world. One of the most significant and decisive wars of position would be market that 
furnishes the stones of path to a social –and economic- liberalization and the accurate defeat of 
extremism. The market has been anymore a sphere of struggle.13 To be sure, the issue is not to 
persuade masses to a reality unchangeable or unshakable, quite the contrary it is “to supply a 
religious product” appropriate for focusing groups’ real and/or assumed expectations. This has 
had two results. One is that “a religious thing or product” is to find itself place in a conservative-
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moderate course by cleansing its radical ingredients. Other is that a partial secularization is to 
begin.14  
 
Consequently, a new market for commodities, media, advertising, business and consumption 
termed as “Islamic” has enabled the formation of a new culture industry. This Islamic culture 
industry has moved more and more into a good many sectors, such as production, packaging, 
distribution of religious products, embedded to capitalist relationships from traditional written 
media, cassette preaching, online fatwas to fashionable hijab. As Gökarıksel and McLarney have 
stated, Islamic knowledge, performances and selves have been increasingly presented by a 
commoditized cultural forms and spaces. “Embedded into traditional-nonmodern structures and 
relations, Muslim identities have been anymore created in a commodified practices and 
consumption patterns, from memories, novels, lifestyles, magazines, and newspapers to television 
channels; from religious education centers, and halal markets and restaurants (where food is 
prepared according to Islamic rules)”.15 Therefore, in Islamic world religious views have been 
ever-incresingly shaping the ways of consumption. Likewise, asserting that one of the most 
important characters of capitalism, which sprout in Islamic world, has been that this development 
(of capitalism) has gone parallel with the resurrection of Islamic belief, Nasr points out that 
people, who live according to Islam, have demanded that the products, which they are using, 
should be Islamic, not only halal foods and headscarf, but also Islamic housing, fashion, banking, 
education, entertainment, consumer goods (as in examples of Mecca Cola and Oibla Cola, 
preferably to European-origin Coke and Pepsi), and even holiday.16 From all these views, we can 
conclude that Islamic movements and groups have not existed outside of the modern institutions 
and practices. A Muslim identity itself can be no longer constructed by being isolated from 
entirely secular everyday life’s experiences and activities. An entity embedded to modern 
capitalist relations and structures, an Islamic culture then can be alleged to have transformed by 
harmonizing itself with new conditions of the global-capitalist world. So, there would not be 
purely a unique Islamic culture that leaves itself out modern cultural patterns and practices and 
rejects, all-modern capitalist values and principles. It is a fragmented culture more synthesized 
with the capitalist lifestyles and practices than with a original Islamic tradition and culture 
 
3 How to Conduct a Political Study: Analyzing Islamist Politics Using the 
Sociology of Islam  
 
The question, ‘how can a political change be explained and apprehend?’, unavoidably encourages 
us to ask that of ‘what makes a political change possible?’. The answer to those questions are, in 
a sense, hidden in a perspective that argues how we should look at analyze political structures, 
relationships and processes. No doubt, a perspective firstly attempts to study any fact or event, 
whatever political or social, by using certain form of analysis which provides us various concepts 
and conceptualizations in order to examine an issue. Because, as Allan remarked, the perspective 
includes a theory and theoretical explanations, described as a way of seeing the world. It is based 
on many assumptions and arguments composed of particular ideas, concepts and language. 
Ranging from functionalism, conflict theory, interactionist theory, and critical theory to exchange 
theory, rational choice theory, ethnomethodology, and social phenomenology, all perspectives 
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express us ‘how to see the social –political- world and how to analyze it’. They are filters which 
provide that we can perceive and interpret whole things around.17   For instance, any perspective 
might suggest that one should pay regard to some socio-economic factors such as the formation 
of new social classes, the economic development and the wealth, the capital accumulation, when 
studying the transformations in the political structures and relationships. Another asserts that one 
should consider a range of the political structures, consisting of state, political parties, ideologies, 
intellectual leadership, political actors, relationships and so on, by emphasizing that the changes 
in political sphere have been directly associated with political institutions/structures, facts and 
processes as an autonomous sphere with contradictions, antagonisms and conflicts peculiar to 
itself, independently from economic structure.   In the case of Turkey, asking question of “What 
is the role of the Islamic bourgeoisie in the fragmentation, and even in a possible end, of 
fundamentalist Islamism in Turkish politics?” Yavuz signifies that the emergence of new middle 
classes have played a role important in transformation of Islamic groups, and thus of Islamic 
politics. It has been argued that in Turkey Islamist movements have not emerged the shantytown 
of big cities, on the contrary they have become more visible by the rising of new economic-social 
groups by way of the wealth and the education. In his view, it was these groups, particularly 
Islamic bourgeoisie, who had happen the main actor of Islamization of consumer patterns and the 
pioneering of the existing democratization in Turkey.18 As would be seen, the transformations in 
the political structures, namely state, political parties and actors, ideology, and intellectual 
leadership, have been depended on a series of changes or transformations in economic sphere. 
Put it another way, it would be claimed that the changing structures, like economy, education or 
culture, in society have influenced and designed the political institutions and relationships. What 
is more, these changes would be implied to have had a rather revolutionary essence.  For, they 
have integrated those societies with the global economy and transformed them by exposing 
Muslim societies to a revolutionary transformation  in political sense towards democracy,  rights 
of woman, the respect for diversity, and the remove from extremisms.19 Thus, there would be a 
modernist- fragmented representative politics, meaning that the Islamic social groups have been 
represented by different political ideologies and parties in society, in keeping with the dispersed 
and disjoined religious groups and organizations in virtue of the changes and transformations in 
the economic structure. Therefore, a political analysis must be directly begun by taking social or 
economic changes into consideration, by very reason of fact that a political event or fact has been 
more linked to those. 
 
Connectedly with socio-economic context in the light of the foregoing perspective, there would 
be also alleged that transformations in political structures or institutions have made way for 
forming a more moderate and non-radicalism politics in Islamist political movement. What lies 
behind such an assertion have been, as stated above, differentiation, pluralization, and separate 
social classes and economic interests in question among Islamic groups. They have set the stage 
for forming divergent political views and stances within Muslim societies, and thus arising a 
political tolerance as sign of a moderateness far from dogmatic. On this point, for instance, 
Demiralp links this political moderation to the changing economic interests in socio-economic 
groups that have had a certain economic capital and power and redesigned their own political 
preferences, because of getting changed their class positions. According to her idea, the 
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moderation can just be functionalized with embracing a politics that approaches easy-going to 
West and its basic principles, and with accepting market economy and liberal democracy as a 
political-economic system. In case of Turkey, “This definition of moderation has been termed as 
moving away from the "national view," formulated to express the political views of the Islamist 
parties in Turkey until the late 1990, leaded by Necmettin Erbakan, a prominent Turkish-Islamist 
politician and the founder of Islamist politics in the late 1960s.”20 The reason is that  these social 
groups have tended to support a more morate Islamist politics as connected with shifting their 
own economic interests in globalized era, when an open market economy and minimal state has 
been implemented and defended since the late 1970s and early 1980s. They have been seeing 
their future in a Turkey integrating with global world and embracing its political and economic 
principles. Therefore, by abadoning from the radical political course of National View, they have 
directed to a moderate-conservative politics that would advocate their economic interests. While 
new religious elites have politically and ideologically conflicted with secularist state elites on the 
one hand, on the other they have tried to come to power by challeging the outmoded Islamist 
politics of Erbakan movement and other centre-right politics represented by Justice Party in 
1960s and 1970s, and True Path Party and Motherland Party after 1980.  
 
However, Somer argues that rather than a conflict between the elites mentioned above, the 
present battle has been a class struggle: between conservative and secularist middle classes. 
According to him, the former has stood close to moderate and “pro-modern sort of Islamism”. 
The latter has consistently discredited all types of Islamism.21 The new political position of the 
Islamist politics in Turkey, states Somer, would be more connected with what economic policies 
have been implemented since it was be a result of the changing economic interests. Once upon a 
time, in Turkey the pious-conservative small and middle-sized corporations had supported pro-
islamic politics, National View’s parties, with the aid of protecting their own economic interests 
against the dominant secular political elites and the state-promoted capital groups from the end of 
1960s up to the beginning of 1980s. However, they changed their political tendencies in 1980s, 
when neoliberal and market-focused economic policies were implemented by Özal, who was a 
conservative-Turkish politician and the founder of Motherland Party after 1980 military coup 
d’ėtat.   This situation has laid the economic and social bases of a new political position in 
Islamic politics. They withdrew their support from a more radical and religious-minded Islamist 
politics as soon as they increased their capital accumulation, and started to compete with the 
more advanced markets of Turkey and Europe in the late 1990s. They thus abandoned an Islamist 
politics performed by National View tradition, following a more aggressive politics in conflict 
with secular-state elites.22 All in all, the changing economic interests would cause different 
political separations among Islamic groups as well. They would be a propelling force of new 
political positions prefered by those conservative-religious middle classes. Put another way, what 
makes a variety of political choices and/or ideological positions possible would be class positions 
becoming differentiated from upper classes to lower classes. 
 
Indeed, considering all these changes and transformations, namely globalization, neoliberal 
policies, and religious market(s), it seems that the class structures and the economic interests 
have given rise to differentiation and pluralist structurings and groupings. In the pursuit of 
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globalization and neoliberal policies of economy, new religious markets established around the 
world but particularly in the Muslim world. In those markets, Introvigne asserts that the extremist 
religious consumers have identified religion with culture, and thus politics with religion, and they 
have been seeing no difference between them. Moderate conservatives allege that there has been, 
and should be, a difference between religion, politics and culture. However, they would like to be 
an active religion in public sphere, and rejects separation between religion and politics, although 
a difference between two.23 Here Introvigne more focuses on the present relationship between 
class and the market, and their links to consumption. He states that with the positions within 
economic structures, they have politicized religion differently from others and politically defined 
themselves as radical Islamist, or moderate conservative. Most of all, he underlines that the 
foregoing structures	have unavoidably caused political divisions separated from one another in 
Islamist politics. For him, this would be explicitly seen in a series of divergent political fractions 
like radical Islamist, moderate-Islamist, conservative, moderate conservative, and even liberal-
Islamist or/and liberal-conservative. 
 
4 The Autonomy of Politics: Is it possible to make a Political Study by thinking in 
the Boundaries of ‘Political’? 
 
The political structures, included state, political parties, ideologies, intellectual leadership, 
political actors and participants, or political events and facts, should be paid attention in order to 
clarify and comprehend a political movement or ideology in a political analysis. If the political 
structures is accepted as an autonomous sphere in Althusserian sense from others such as 
economy, culture or market without falling into a reductionist viewpoint, this attention begins to 
be a more important. In the preceding title, we have mentioned from a reductionist form of 
analysis, which has been rather dominant in the political studies of Islamic politics, in sense of 
accounting for political structures/insititutions and relationships in others’ supervision, namely 
economy, or culture. On the contrary, at this point we will argue that it is a more accurate 
analysis to study any political movement, ideology, group or party, by regarding Islamist politics 
and organizations, their political ideologies, practices, conflicts, experiences and relationships in 
its own political history. The analysis based on a sociological background, included economy, 
class position, education, culture, and consumption or lifestyle, have not explained us too much 
in political sense. For, the political structures and activities are ones that have several dynamics, 
contradictions and antagonisms inherent in themselves in Althusserian sense24. So, we will state 
why a political study is more important than other approach based on certain sociological 
changes or transformations in Muslim societies and composed of economic and social factors like 
economy, capital, class structure, education, culture, and consumption. In case of Turkey, for 
instance, a analysis of Islamist parties should be made by considering the present political 
organizations, ideological-political relationships, experiences and battles in Turkish political 
history, rather than with whom these parties have represented, they have been supported by 
which social classes, and what the cultural bases and patterns, and the social bases of those 
parties have been. As Jenkins has stated, despite the fact that an Islamist sentiment has been on 
the rise in Turkey since the end of 1980s, and at the beginning of 1990s, the electorial success of 
Welfare Party, an Islamist party founded by Erbakan, was due to well-funded, highly effective 
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party organization and to widespread public disappointment with the mainstream political 
parties.25 In other words, the ideological organization and activity of a political party, as in 
example of Welfare party, to get masses’ supports would be one of the most efficient 
mechanisms. The main reason for the political achivement of the party in question would ‘its 
organizational flexibility and strategic use of modern means to mobilize traditional networks.26 
 
So closely interested in the issue regarding how to analyze Islamic politics, Mohammed Ayoop 
offers a political study, proposing that it has been more significant to look at the political 
structures, processes and relationships in the context of cases of Indonesia and Turkey. In his 
study, basically he signifies that legal-political restrictions on Islamist-political discourses have 
had a moderating effect on Islamist political groups. In the case of Turkey, he alleges that in the 
result of a series of events of past two decades, on the ground that the Turkish establishment had 
abandoned from its oppressive tendencies on Islamist parties, they became more moderate, thus 
forming a connection between democratization and Islamist modernization.27 In Turkey, Jenkins 
states that the Virtue Party, one of prominent Islamist parties founded after the Islamist Welfare 
Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court, has prefered a more moderate political 
position, by emphasizing its loyalty of secularism and assinging a number of secular women to 
the party rule.28	 	 With important resemblances to Turkey, Indonesia has undergone similar 
changes by moderating its Islamist politics in the wake of –political- struggle with secular-
nationalist forces.29 Indicating that Indonesia’s islamist party, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera; PKS), decided to take a range of steps to reshape its political stance for being 
a moderate religious party by rejecting the label Islamism, Tomsa underlines that in Indonesia 
political processes have drawn the party to a moderate line through the political-institutional 
constraints and opportunities in consequence of political learning.30 On this point, particularly in 
both countries the compensative power of secular-nationalist forces have demonstrated the failure 
of Islamist parties. Thus, in the case of Indonesia and Turkey, the fact that the Islamist parties 
have had to politically compromise with secularist forces is so clear in moving towards a more 
moderate politics and demoratic struggle. However, considering Turkey, the ascending visibility 
of Islam in Turkish society and politics seems to have been associated more with “the 
democratization of state-society relationships” within the context of seamlessly breaking from 
militant laicism.31 
 
Accordingly, in the light of Ayoop’s and Jenkins’ arguments above, when clarifying how to 
analyze Islamist politics, we have drawn attention to political institutions, facts, relationships, and 
struggles inside their own political history. They have significant components to comprehend and 
study any Islamist politics and political organizations within the borders of ‘political’. They are 
analytical tools not to be ignored in a political study.  At this point, in Turkey, one of the most 
remarkable political processes not to be overlooked would be 28 February intervention in 1997. 
Called as February 28 Process, this political event was eminently important to find out how the 
Islamist politics has transformed in Turkey. It was a process to start with decisions taken by 
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military and civil bureaucrats in one meeting of National Security Council, an institution 
comprised of the military and civil executives, on 28 February, 1997.  It was one of the recent 
political conflicts between Turkish political Islamists and the secular military-civil establishment. 
No doubt, first and foremost, it was a political-military intervention that had been claimed to be 
interfered to stand out against the threats of Islamization, and at the same time, it was one of 
turning points to force the Islamist politics for change in Turkey. From now on, Turkish political 
Islamists started to change their ideological-political position following the political event in 
question. In pursuit of this intervention, the Virtue Party –Fazilet Partisi-, one of Islamist political 
parties replacing the former Islamist Welfare Party –Refah Partisi-, begun to more care about 
democratization, human rights and the rule of law for a democratic regime. In spite of its 
emphasis on the social and cultural aspects of Islam, the party cautiously refrained from the 
obvious references to Islam and the expressions against the secular establishment.32 In the wake 
of rising to power by forming a coalition with a center right-prominent party, the True Path Party, 
in those times, the unsuccessful political experience of the WP –Welfare Party-, which was shut 
down after 28 February military intervention, compelled Turkish Islamists to a change just in 
strategy and tactics but also in political views and visions of the National View33. The idea of 
change in the political Islamists was not restricted with the rigid precautions of the 28 February 
Process. It has been, too, directly connected with the acceptance of democratization.34 Soon after 
February 28 military intervention, the Virtue Party (VP) had diverged from its predecessor in 
many points, including its changing views with regard to West and its new stance towards human 
rights, rule of law, democracy, freedom of faith and religion. The party had changed its stance 
against the West and the western institutions, and unceasingly emphasized western political 
values such as human rights, rule of law, and democracy. These political principles and values 
constituted the new political position of the National View movement after the Welfare Party was 
shut down and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was banned from political life.35  
 
For one things, in Turkey Islamist politics seems to have begun to change following the 28 
February Process, one of important political events restructuring the Islamist political entities and 
relationships in Turkey. Likewise, in Indonesia the political conflicts, encounters or relationships 
between Islamist actors and secularist forces also reshaped political actors and formations. So 
then, in a political analysis all these things per se, namely economy, class position, capital 
accumulation, technological and communicational tools, globalization, education and culture, 
would not be able to account for reasons why one political party or movement has transformed. 
Other conceptual-analytical tools are needed to study a political thing, whatever a political party, 
movement, or ideology. Among them must be political structures, relationships and processes 
with political agencies, ideologies, and intellectual leaderships in Althusserian sense. Ultimately, 
the key to comprehend and examine political structures and processes is a political analysis based 
on all everything which become more visible within the boundaries of ‘political’ from political 
structures/institutions to political groups/actors and events/facts, ideologies, intellectual 
leaderships, and processes. All in all, such an analysis explains us why and how the foregoing 
political structures and organizations, ideological-political positions and identities/belongings, 
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intellectual leaderships, and political struggles and relationships have changed, and are still 
changing.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In this article, the aim has been fundamentally to ask if or not there would be an alternative 
perspective able to analyze how to change or transform Islamist politics in Muslim societies, by 
criticizing the dominant approach in the studies on Islamism, Islamist political movements and 
actors. This approach can be stated to have been more reductionist in sense of asserting that 
political structures, relationships, and facts/events have undergone a change, as a result of 
transforming the socio-economic structures and relationships of Muslim societies.  from 
economy, class position, capital accumulation, culture, and education till technological-
communicative innovations, globalization and neoliberal policies. Alleging that Islamist politics 
have been able to change in line with  the transformation of sociological appearances of Islamic 
world  in a globalized world, the analytical tools of an approach to study Islamist politics would 
consist of a range of sociological factors, such as economy, class position, capital accumulation, 
culture, and education till technological-communicative innovations, globalization and neoliberal 
policies, and more importantly it would attempt to study political structures or institutions  by 
focusing on them. However, it is eminently disputable concerning how and to what extent we can 
account for Islamist politics on the basis of the claims of the dominant approach in question in a 
political analysis. For this reason, we have at first tried to show how a political analysis can be 
made by laying emphasis on the political events, like 28 February Process, and the political 
conflicts, antagonisms, relationships, and ideological-intellectual struggles between the political-
Islamist actors and the secularist-nationalist establishment in the cases of Indonesia and Turkey. 
All in all, we have pointed out that a political analysis should concentrate on the present political-
ideological structures and institutions within political sphere, each of which contain unique 
dynamics, contradictions and antagonisms in itself, as seen in the cases of Turkey and Indonesia, 
if it will attempt at explaining how the political currents, whether Islamic or not, has undergone a 
change. 
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